International interdependence is marked by transnational legal disputes that may come under the jurisdiction of multiple states. The principle of deference -acceptance of the exercise of legal authority by another state -is one mechanism to manage such jurisdictional conflicts. Despite the importance of deference in international law and cooperation, little is known about the causes of the variation in its use. In this article, we first develop a theory of deference that focuses on the role that domestic institutions and norms play in assuring procedural and substantive fairness. We then test this theory in an original dataset concerning accession practices in the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction. Our findings offer considerable support for the idea that states evaluate partners on the likelihood that they can offer a fair legal process. By exploring the politics underlying parental childabduction, we offer a nuanced account of the link between domestic institutions and international cooperation.
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The crossborder movement of people, goods, and information places individuals and firms under the jurisdiction of multiple states. This leads to transnational disputes in which the parties involved face different legal demands and multiple venues in which to resolve them. 1 With the rise of globalization, such conflicts over jurisdiction have spread across a range of sectors and issue areas, including criminal law, labor rights, family issues, antitrust, intellectual property, Internet governance, migration, as well as service and product standards. The resolution of these jurisdictional conflicts is of considerable importance for global governance, as it determines the rights and obligations of transnational actors that make globalization possible and often influences the distribution of economic and political resources among them.
Moreover, their resolution shapes the allocation of governance authority: Whose law governs transnational activity, which legal institutions have the right to adjudicate disputes arising from such activity, and what regulatory bodies may enforce penalties? The answers to these questions matter not only to disputing parties; they also determine the extent to which a state can shape transnational interactions in accordance with its policy goals and preferences. The ability to apply, adjudicate, and enforce its laws in transnational disputes enhances the state's sphere of influence; an inability to do so puts curbs on the scope, reach, and effectiveness of national rules and makes them vulnerable to forum shopping and a regulatory race to the bottom.
3
The literature interested in such globalization frictions has focused on two management strategies: national treatment or harmonization. On the one hand, as actors move from their home country to a foreign country, they become subject to the national legal authority of that foreign country.
The jurisdictional conflict is resolved by having firms and citizens play by the foreign country's rules, 1 Buxbaum 2001; Berman 2002; Farrell and Newman 2014 . 2 Sell 2003; Damro 2006; Pollack and Shaffer 2009 . 3 Whytock 2009. while sometimes allowing them to challenge those rules through international dispute-settlement mechanisms. On the other hand, states may work collectively -through international agreements or regulatory networks -to devise common standards and best practices that harmonize national rules.
Once states have adopted the same rules, there are fewer chances to engage in forum shopping or regulatory arbitrage, and the jurisdictional conflict is mitigated. 4 In this article, we examine a third way to manage the jurisdictional frictions raised by globalization: deference. Deference is one state's acceptance of the exercise of jurisdiction by another state. States engage in deference by abstaining from exercising their own legal authority or by validating the legal measures or decisions of another state. For example, a state may abstain from prosecuting a criminal and, instead, extradite the fugitive to stand trial in a foreign country; or it might validate the consumer-safety standards of a foreign government, allowing the import and distribution of goods produced in accordance with those standards rather than its own. Deference occurs both through casespecific decisions made by judges or regulators, and more formal agreements between states that commit them to defer. As the agreements often lay the foundation for the case-specific decisions that follow, it is deference agreements that are the focus of our inquiry. Such agreements play a key role across a host of global-governance issues, including trade and business transactions, product standards, extradition, anti-trust, Internet governance, financial regulation, and migration.
5
Although deference is an extremely common tool of governance, it has received little systematic attention in the International Relations (IR) literature. Thus, we know little about the political conditions under which a state may agree to defer to the legal rules, decisions, or enforcement authority of another state. In the legal literature, deference-based cooperation is seen as motivated by friendly diplomatic relations as well as by demand-side factors: extensive cross-border interaction in terms of trade, the left-behind parent. Second, the regime against international child abduction offers a typical case of an agreement in which member states commit to deferring to each other. That agreement is the 1980
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, promulgated by the Hague
Conference on Private International Law (hereafter: the Hague Abduction Convention or the Hague Convention). 10 The convention requires the judicial and administrative authorities of the country of refuge to secure the child's prompt return to the country of origin. Fulfilling this requirement requires deference: the authorities of the country of refuge accept that the custody dispute will not be decided by local law; rather, the dispute should be governed by the country of origin's laws and adjudicated there.
Third, the Hague Convention allows us to easily observe and measure a commitment to deference, since such a commitment does not arise automatically between convention members. Once a state accedes to the convention and becomes a new member, each of the preexisting members has to decide individually whether to accept the accession and exercise deference vis-à-vis the acceding state.
An event-history analysis of all acceding-country acceptances finds considerable support for our argument emphasizing the importance of procedural and substantive fairness considerations in the deference decision. We use the rule of law as an indicator of procedural fairness, and gender equalitycaptured by women's parliamentary membership -as a measure of substantive fairness in custody disputes. As the gap between the acceding and accepting country's rule of law grows by one point, the likelihood of acceptance drops by 26%. As the gap in women's parliamentary membership increases by one percentage-point, the likelihood of acceptance diminishes by 1%.
To our knowledge, this study offers the first systematic evaluation of deference agreements from a global perspective. As such, it makes a number of critical contributions to issues ranging from global governance to international law. A central concern of globalization is the management of the frictions 10 Anton 1981.
produced by cross-border exchange. This study suggests that in addition to national treatment, formal dispute-settlement mechanisms, or international policy coordination, distributed authority among domestic institutions can play an important role in managing these frictions. 11 By relying on the competence of domestic regulators, agencies, and courts, deference agreements can provide the infrastructure for international cooperation. 12 Finally, the article makes an important empirical contribution by offering the first IR analysis of the efforts against international child abduction. The account we develop sheds light on the challenges of law-enforcement cooperation as borders erode.
Resolving Jurisdictional Conflicts through Deference
A key challenge of globalization is the management of jurisdictional conflicts. Increasing cross-border movement and activity bring a variety of actors -individuals, families, firms, goods, or service providers -under the purview of multiple legal systems. What are the ways to resolve the conflict between states' competing and overlapping claims of legal authority?
States' management of such conflicts typically takes one of three approaches. The first is national treatment: a country exercises its national jurisdiction over firms' and individuals' behavior, regardless of their country of origin. This approach preserves the full legal authority and sovereignty of the state in question and rejects the competing claims of other countries. A case in point is the GATT/WTO: members are allowed to enforce their product standards vis-a-vis imported goods, as long as those standards apply equally to locally produced goods. 13 National treatment may sometimes be complemented by a mechanism for international dispute resolution. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), for example, typically subject foreign investors to the domestically applicable rules for investment, but 11 Schmidt 2007, 672 . 18 Putnam 1988; Fearon 1998. Deference offers a third solution to the jurisdictional-overlap dilemma by calling on states to accept each other's authority to regulate or decide the issue at stake. Such deference can take one of two forms: abstention or validation. Deference through abstention means that the home country declines to apply its rules or exercise its jurisdiction; it allows the foreign country to exercise its jurisdiction over the matter and determine the legal outcome. By contrast, validation means that the foreign country's legal measures or decisions are considered valid and effective within the home country's territory; the home country applies or enforces the measures as if they were issued by the home country's authorities themselves. Deference is thus different both from national treatment and harmonization. Under national treatment, the home country maintains regulatory authority or jurisdiction, whereas deference involves an effective transfer of jurisdiction from the home country to the foreign country: the home country relinquishes its own authority by forgoing the application of its laws or by giving force to the foreign country's laws. In other words, deference replaces home-country control with foreign-country control.
19
Like harmonization, deference entails a certain loss of sovereignty, but it allows states to maintain legal diversity and does not require convergence on a single rule.
Advocates of deference view it as a managed form of joint governance that allows a more effective division of labor between regulatory and judicial authorities across countries. It is "a proactive political choice to institutionalize and 'mutualize' extraterritoriality … a reciprocal allocation of jurisdictional authority to prescribe and enforce." 20 The exercise of deference is sometimes made on an ad-hoc, discretionary basis, without a preexisting obligation. Such deference, often referred to in the legal literature as 'comity,' is typically exercised by courts. 21 Our focus, however, is on written friendly relations and a means to prevent a transnational dispute from upsetting those relations.
Countries that are politically aligned might therefore be prone to participate in deference agreements as part of their larger cooperative endeavors. For the latter explanation, deference is viewed as a workaround for the sovereignty-based state system in a world of globalization. Overlapping jurisdictional authority threatens transnational frictions that have the potential to disrupt globalization; deference is one strategy to minimize these frictions, enhance the efficiency and convenience of transnational exchange, and facilitate interdependence. 36 Following a more functionalist logic, this demand-side argument expects deference to arise between states that engage in significant transnational exchange and thus face a higher risk of friction.
While emphasizing the benefits of deference to resolving jurisdictional conflicts, the legal literature recognizes that states sometimes decline to defer due to fairness concerns. Such concerns, for example, may thwart the extradition of criminal suspects unlikely to enjoy a fair trial abroad, and they may block the enforcement of foreign judgments resulting from unfair trials. 37 To date, however, no econometric analysis has evaluated the influences that shape deference decisions -including the impact of fairness concerns. We thus turn to theorizing and empirically assessing these decisions.
35 Posner and Sunstein 2007; Dodge 2014 . 36 Berman 2002 Whytock 2009 . 37 Brilmayer 1989; Whytock and Robertson 2011; Manguson 2012; Bassiouni 2014, 56-57 .
A Domestic Institutional Account of Deference: Expectations of Fairness
While deference may avert diplomatic disputes or respond to demand-side pressures, it raises concerns of potential political costs. We develop an argument focusing on the role that domestic institutions and norms play in allaying these concerns by reassuring a state that its citizens or firms will be treated fairly by the foreign government. In particular, we emphasize the importance of the relative assessment of procedural and substantive rules by the partner states in determining whether to commit to deference.
The exercise of deference puts one's citizens or firms under the authority of a foreign government: when a home country defers to a foreign authority through validation or abstention, it is the foreign authority that gets to regulate or adjudicate the matter. This raises concerns of possible bias, regulatory failure, normative incongruence, or shirking. A home country's citizen could face foreign authorities that are biased due to corruption, prejudice, or political interference. Additionally, if the foreign state does not conduct its regulatory or judicial processes effectively, the home country's citizen will suffer the consequences of regulatory failures, such as delays or bureaucratic errors. Concerns of normative incongruity arise when the home country's citizen is subject to foreign rules or decisions that are inconsistent with those of the home country, leading to outcomes that are undesirable or objectionable by the home country's standards. Finally, deference involves concerns about shirking: the foreign country may enjoy the home country's deference, but will itself refuse to defer to the home country in a reciprocal manner.
All these problems might result in a political blowback for the home country's government:
corporations, individuals, and other actors may highlight the adverse consequences of deference and blame the government. 38 Regulators may face increased oversight or budgetary punishment by political 38 Magnuson 2012, 888.
principals, who seek to shift blame. 39 Relatedly, bias, regulatory failure, or shirking by a foreign government can produce political scandals that mobilize constituencies and put pressure on homegovernment officials.
We argue that states weigh the costs and benefits of deference agreements through the notion of fairness: Will a state's citizens or firms receive an equitable and just treatment from the foreign authorities? 40 Expectations of fair treatment on the part of the foreign country will serve several goals.
First, they diffuse concerns of bias and political interference as well as ease suspicions concerning bureaucratic weakness that might result in a regulatory failure. Second, foreign-country fairness increases the likelihood of a just outcome for the parties to the dispute: an outcome that is consistent with fundamental notions of justice and public policy in the home country. Along these lines, Putnam finds that U.S. courts generally constrain the extraterritorial application of American law, except in cases where fundamental rights are at stake. In such cases, U.S. courts fear that a lack of action could undermine the integrity of the U.S. legal system. As guardians of the core norms of the political community, they exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over conduct that is alleged to violate these norms. 41 Similarly, when deferring to a foreign legal system, the home country will seek to ensure, at a minimum, that the outcome of the dispute will not be at odds with its own fundamental values and notions of justice. Finally, a fair legal system will have a greater tendency to comply with its reciprocal commitment to defer. Compliance with that commitment is less likely to fall victim to bias, political interference, or regulatory failure.
How is one to evaluate the likelihood of a fair treatment by the foreign country? We argue that such an evaluation considers the foreign country's domestic legal institutions and norms. This argument 39 Singer 2007. 40 Albin 2001; Berman 2002; Slaughter 2003 . 41 Putnam 2009. follows studies that highlight the role of democratic institutions and procedures in facilitating international cooperative endeavors 42 as well as studies that identify the role of democratic norms and values in promoting cooperation. 43 Much of this work focuses on individual-country characteristics and their impact on international cooperation: it suggests that democracies tend to cooperate more. Yet another line of work argues that it is not simply the characteristics of any single country that shape cooperation; rather, it is the relative relationship between institutions or norms in the partner countries.
Leeds, for example, finds that democratic countries are more likely to cooperate with one another because of shared accountability mechanisms and similar costs to cooperation failure. 44 Applied to deference, we argue that the evaluation of fairness involves an assessment of the institutions and norms in the foreign country relative to those of the home country: a state uses its own regulatory and legal system as the reference point with which to evaluate a potential partner. This argument also comports with psychological research indicating the subjective nature of fairness perceptions: individuals tend to judge fairness based on their own dispositions and circumstances. 45 Next, we argue that the fairness assessment is bifurcated in that it includes both procedural fairness and substantive fairness. 46 Procedural considerations are commonly subsumed under the notion of the rule of law. These include issues such as the independence of judiciary and regulatory agencies as well as the bureaucratic capacity to enforce rules; access to the courts and timeliness of decisions; and safeguards against undue external influence on the legal process in the form of political pressure or corruption. Also important are the relative procedural rules in the two states, such that one's citizen is assured an equivalent experience before a foreign authority. This is especially true for states that enjoy 42 The decision to commit to deference is not only based on the procedural rules in place in the cooperating states, but also on the substantive norms that undergird them. 47 The greater the disparity in core norms between the two countries, the less likely it is for the home state to expect that its citizens or firms will receive similar treatment from the foreign legal system. This does not mean that the two states must have identical rules, but it does suggest that deference will be difficult between states that have disparate views on fundamental values such as human rights, legal equality, environmental protection, or labor standards. 48 We argue that a state uses its own institutions and norms as the reference point for evaluating other states; it is less likely to defer to states that fall below this reference point and thus cannot guarantee treatment that the evaluating state would deem fair. 49 In other words, Country A will be less comfortable deferring to Country B to the extent that country B's level of procedural or substantive fairness is weaker than A's. A legal process whose procedure and substantive norms are below the notions of fairness in the home country might settle the dispute in a manner that is not acceptable to the home country and risk political blowback; the idea of subjecting one's own national to a foreign legal system thus becomes less palatable. In addition, nonobservance of fairness standards makes it less likely 47 Nicolaidis and Shaffer 2005; Putnam 2009 . 48 Brilmayer 1989; Bliesener 1994. 49 This argument shares some similarities with prospect theory, according to which individuals evaluate alternative courses of action relative to a reference point: outcomes below the reference point are considered losses, and outcomes exceeding it are viewed as gains. Individuals' foremost concern, however, is the avoidance of loss. Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Levy 2003. that the foreign country will comply with its commitment to defer to the home country in the reverse circumstances, thereby increasing fears of shirking. We test these expectations within the context of the Hague Abduction Convention. Before turning to the empirical analysis, we present some background on the convention and suggest the empirical expectations derived from our theoretical emphasis on procedural and substantive fairness.
Cooperating against Child Abduction through Deference
At the center of our inquiry is one of the most successful agreements concerning international legal cooperation: the Hague Abduction Convention. International child abduction is a situation in which one parent has moved with the child to another country, without the knowledge or consent of the left-behind parent. The primary victim of the abduction is the child, who suffers from the disruption of their stable routine, loss of contact with a parent, and the necessity to adapt to a new family and social environment.
This experience may cause severe trauma, as well feelings of anger, resentment and guilt -sometimes with long-term effects. 50 Separated from their children, left-behind parents bear emotional distress and hardship; they also face the financial burden of searching for the child and seeking their return. Abducting parents typically wish to obtain a right of custody in the country of refuge that would legalize the factual situation that they have created through the removal of the child. The Hague Convention's primary objective is to deter such action by restoring the pre-abduction status quo through the prompt return of the child to the country of origin, with the decision on custody to be taken by the authorities of that country. Indeed, the convention does not seek to regulate or determine the award of custody rights. Rather, it rests on the principle that custody rights should be debated before and decided by the authorities of the country where the child resided prior to the abduction. 57 The convention thus requires the administrative or judicial authorities of the country of refuge to ensure the child's return. To that end, contracting states designate a Central Authority (typically, a unit within the ministry of justice or a ministry of social affairs). In response to an incoming application for return, the Central Authority of the country of refuge is tasked with discovering the whereabouts of an abducted child; securing the voluntary return of the child or bringing about an amicable resolution of the issues; in case of failure of the latter, initiating or facilitating judicial proceedings aimed at obtaining the return of the child; and providing administrative arrangements to secure the safe return of the child.
Overall, the rules and mechanisms established by the Hague Convention have proven quite
effective. Approximately 50% of the applications for returning a child result in the child's being returned: in 20% of applications the return is voluntary, and in 30% the return follows a court order. it is also an appropriate ground for analyzing deference, since this principle is at the convention's core:
The custody dispute is not to be decided in the country of refuge; rather, it is to be settled by the authorities of the country of origin in accordance with its laws. Additionally, the convention has a broad and diverse membership: 93 countries (as of December 2014) convention. Most members of the convention, however, did not meet the condition for ratification and joined the convention through accession. The act of accession to the Hague Convention does not carry multilateral or bilateral consequences. Rather, each state that joined the convention earlier -through ratification or accession -has to decide individually whether to engage in treaty relations with the acceding country; the same prerogative belongs to countries that ratified the convention at a later stage, even as to accessions that took place before they joined the treaty. The willingness to cooperate with the new member and return children to them is expressed through an acceptance of that member's accession:
a formal act of depositing a declaration indicating the acceptance. 60 For our purposes, this process has the advantage of providing a measurable signal of the willingness to commit to deference.
Moreover, we believe that the convention is good ground for testing our fairness hypothesis in deference agreements. One reason is that the convention addresses a civil matter -a child-custody dispute -rather than a criminal issue. Given that legal systems process many more civil cases than criminal ones, deference in a civil matter is more representative of the universe of cases than deference in a criminal context. 61 Furthermore, a civil matter is a harder case for our argument than a criminal matter. In criminal law, the wrongdoer suffers punishment -oftentimes, imprisonment. Therefore, criminal justice requires higher standards of fairness compared to civil justice. For instance, the standard of proof in a criminal case -beyond a reasonable doubt -is higher than the balance of probabilities that must be proven in a civil case (i.e., it is more likely than not that the defendant caused harm or loss).
One would thus expect a greater insistence on fairness in criminal-law deference and a more relaxed approach in a civil matter such as child custody. 60 Bruch 2000. 61 For example, a total of 278,442 civil cases were filed in U.S. district courts in 2012, whereas only 71,303 criminal cases were filed that year. Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
Additionally, the Hague Abduction Convention is an important case that allows for a clean test of our fairness argument. Compared with many other deference agreements, this convention shows little explicit concern about cross-country differences in notions of fairness. Agreements on foreign-judgment enforcement, for example, often include an escape clause that permits a country to avoid enforcement of a foreign judgment that conflicts with its public policy or public order. 62 Such an escape clause opens a wide door for refusing deference on procedural or substantive grounds. This signals the plausibility of our argument; however, it makes it difficult to interpret the impact of fairness on the commitment to deference: states could agree to defer in principle, but then invoke the escape clause to address fairness issues as they arise.
The text of the Hague Convention, however, does little to accommodate legal-fairness concerns.
The obligation to return the child applies regardless of any legal differences between the child's country of origin and the country of refuge, and there is no broad public-policy exception that allows nonreturn;
the inclusion of such an exception in the convention was considered and rejected. The primary exceptions have to do not with general concerns of law or policy, but with the factual particularities of the case (e.g., the child objects to being returned or could face physical harm if returned). The convention does allow return to be refused if it is inconsistent with human rights; but beyond this specific concern, no other substantive or procedural attribute of the origin country's legal system can justify nonreturn. The underlying logic is that return is generally in the child's best interests, which should prevail over other concerns. 63 In the absence of a broad public-policy escape clause, fairness concerns must be addressed at the commitment stage, which is the focus of our analysis. We adapt the expectations developed in the theoretical section to the specific case of international child abduction and test them in the following empirical analysis. In terms of procedural fairness (E1), countries will be less likely to defer to countries with a weaker rule of law than their own.
In countries with a weaker rule of law, political intervention could scuttle fair decision-making, the legal process might suffer considerable delays, and decisions might go unenforced. The likely result is a poorer legal experience for the left-behind parent seeking the return of their child and diminished prospects of a reciprocal return of children from such states. In addition, a weaker rule of law might mean that foreigners do not enjoy equal treatment and international commitments are less likely to be observed; this would further diminish the prospects of child return and raise the risk of political fallout in the child's country of origin. In terms of substantive fairness (E2), the majority of cases involve an abducting parent who is the mother. Following the return of the child, the mother will have to litigate the custody dispute in the country of origin. If that country fails to guarantee women's rights and equality, the mother may not be given a full opportunity to make her case, and rules governing custody might be biased against her. States that do protect women's equality will therefore be less likely to defer to countries where women's status is lower.
Data and Method
To empirically examine deference with respect to international child abduction, we constructed a dataset on the acceptance of countries' accessions to the Hague Abduction Convention. The dataset is in the dyad-year format. The first country in each dyad is a country that has joined the convention by way of accession (hereafter: acceding country). From Hungary -the first country to have acceded in 1986 -through Lesotho, which acceded in 2012, the dataset includes a total of 56 acceding countries. The second country in each dyad is the country that has to consider accepting the new member's accession (hereafter: accepting country). The accepting countries are those that have themselves acceded to or ratified the convention prior to the accession of the country in question; in addition, an accession has to be accepted by any country that has ratified the convention at a later stage, subsequent to the accession (for example, Mexico, which acceded in 1991, had to be accepted by Venezuela, which ratified in 1996).
In total, our dataset includes 3332 dyads; an acceptance has occurred in 2073 of them. For each dyad, coverage begins in the year in which the acceding country joined the convention, or, if the accepting country is a late ratifier, in the year of subsequent ratification. Once an acceptance is made, the dyad exits the analysis.
Our first explanatory variable -gap in the rule of law -is based on the Rule of Law indicator from the World Bank's World Governance Indicators. This indicator captures several procedural dimensions of the legal system, including speed of the judicial process and timeliness of decisions, judicial independence, enforcement of court orders, reliability of the police, and the treatment of nonnationals. The gap variable is constructed by subtracting the acceding country's Rule-of-Law value from the accepting country's. This difference is expected to have a negative effect on the acceptance of accessions: the weaker the acceding country's rule of law compared to the accepting country's, the less interested should be the latter in establishing treaty relations with and deferring to the former. The second key variable measures substantive fairness, manifested by gender equality. The indicator is the percentage of parliamentary seats held by women, which has been widely used as a cross-national measure of women's status. 64 As with the rule of law, our variable measures the gap in women's parliamentary membership between the accepting and acceding country; it is expected to be negatively associated with accession acceptance.
64 Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union.
Beyond these key variables, several additional influences may shape the willingness to exercise deference. Following demand-side arguments made in the literature, deference may be based on the potential magnitude of the abduction problem. The larger the number of parents whose children might be abducted abroad, the more important it is to establish a channel that would facilitate the parents' interaction with the foreign authorities and bring about the children's prompt return. Since abductions typically follow a couple's separation or divorce, they might be more common as the national divorce rate rises. We thus control for the rate of divorce in the accepting country. 65 We also control for the stock of migrants residing in the accepting country. A large migrant population might raise the risk of abduction by migrants who would choose to take the child to their country of origin; it therefore increases the need for a mechanism to facilitate child return. 66 We also control for two additional factors that may be associated with an increased risk of abduction: the overall population size in the acceding or accepting country 67 and the two countries' geographic proximity.
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A refusal to exercise deference might spoil the relations with the foreign country in question, and this possible cost likely figures into the decision. The more important these relations, the stronger the incentive to maintain them unharmed by committing to deference. 69 We use ideal point distance in UN General-Assembly voting as an indicator of the political affinity between the acceding and accepting country. 70 Another type of affinity that may encourage deference is legal-system similarity. Countries find international cooperation more palatable when it is based on legal principles that match their own. Table 1 presents the results of three Cox models, all estimating the effects of the independent variables on the time it takes for a newly acceding state to be accepted by other convention members. Models 1 and 2 introduce, in turn, each of the key independent variables. Consistent with the theoretical expectation, Model 1 reveals a statistically significant and substantively large effect of the rule-of-law gap: as this gap increases by one point, the likelihood of acceptance diminishes by 26%. In other words, the weaker the rule of law of the acceding country compared to that of the accepting country, the stronger are the latter's concerns, which are manifested in a lower probability of acceptance. As Model 2
shows, a gap in women's parliamentary membership raises concerns of gender discrimination and also reduces the likelihood of acceptance. A one-point increase of this gap reduces the likelihood of acceptance by 1%; increasing the gap by one standard-deviation thus diminishes the likelihood of acceptance by 13%. Model 3 combines the two independent variables, and the results hold. A gap in the rule of law has a negative, statistically significant, and substantively meaningful effect on the probability of acceptance; so does a gap in women's parliamentary membership.
[ Table 1 [ Figures 1, 2 about here] Figure 1 shows how the gap in the rule of law affects the likelihood of acceptance. When the gap is negative, that is, when the acceding country's rule of law is stronger than that of the accepting country, the cumulative hazard rises steeply (top line; -1.24 is the 10 th percentile). The accepting country is assured that its partner will handle abduction cases in a procedurally fair manner, as a strong rule of law suggests access to the legal system, relatively efficient legal proceedings, and enforcement capacity.
This assurance facilitates the acceptance of the new partner: the accepting country can be reasonably confident that the partner will indeed return abducted children. This confidence, however, diminishes as the rule-of-law gap shifts. The middle line shows that when the acceding and accepting country have similar levels of the rule of law, the cumulative hazard of acceptance rises more moderately. When the acceding country's rule of law is weaker than that of the accepting country (bottom line; 2.4 is the 90 th percentile), the cumulative hazard rises even more slowly. The accepting country is concerned that the rule-of-law weakness might hinder the return of children, and this concern reduces the willingness for acceptance. In Figure 2 , the gap in women's parliamentary membership has a similar influence. A higher rate of women's political representation in the acceding country, compared to the accepting country (gap=-12. 1, 10 th percentile), increases the confidence that abduction cases will be treated in a substantively fair manner; the result is a steep cumulative hazard of acceptance. By contrast, lower political representation of women (gap=22.8, 90 th percentile) means that the acceding country does not meet the accepting country's standards of fairness; specifically, legal proceedings and outcomes might be biased against the mother in a country that does not observe gender equality.
The control variables generally perform as expected (see Model 3). The size of the population in the acceding or accepting country is positively associated with the likelihood of acceptance: a larger population raises the risk of abduction and increases the need for a legal mechanism to allow for children's return. A higher divorce rate and a larger migrant stock in the accepting country also make acceptance more likely: they raise the risk of abduction and the need for a mechanism to facilitate children's return. Geographic distance is negatively associated with acceptance: between countries that are distant there is a lower risk of abduction and less need for a mechanism to facilitate return. Greater distance in UN voting indicates a weaker political affinity and reduces the likelihood of accession acceptance. Legal affinity -a shared legal tradition -increases the chances of an acceptance's being made, as does greater bureaucratic quality in the accepting country. As expected, a Muslim majority considerably reduces the willingness to return children to foreign countries, thereby lowering the likelihood of acceptance.
Overall, our analysis finds support for the diplomatic-relations explanation of deferencecaptured through UN-voting affinity -as well as for demand-side explanations that highlight the magnitude of the abduction problem. In addition, we have shown that deference is shaped by considerations of fairness: states are reluctant to defer to partners that fall below their procedural or substantive standards.
Robustness Checks
Our robustness tests vary both the method of estimation and the measures employed (Table 2) . Model 4 re-estimates Model 3 through a Weibull regression; the results are consistent with those produced by the Cox model. Model 5 exhibits similar results, this time through discrete event-history analysis, which uses a logistic regression combined with a cubic polynomial to adjust for time dependencies. Discrete event-history analysis is particularly appropriate when data are collected in large increments of time, such as years, as is the case with much of IR analysis, including our own. 79 Models 6 and 7 are also discrete-time models, but employ alternative measures of the key covariates. In Model 6, the rule of law was measured through the Law and Order indicator from International Country Risk Guide; the indicator for women's status is the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) measure of women's political rights, including the right to vote, run for political office, and hold elected or appointed government positions. In Model 7, the rule-of-law measure is the judicial independence variable from the CIRI dataset; women's social and economic status was measured through the share of women in the labor force. 80 The results resemble those obtained with the original measures. The gap between the acceding and accepting country in law and order or judicial independence is negatively associated with the acceptance of accessions; a difference in women's political rights or labor-force participation also has a negative influence on accession acceptance.
[ Table 2 about here]
The observational nature of our study raises a concern about potential endogeneity: Could deference agreements promote institutional and normative changes that reduce the fairness gap between cooperating partners? Substantively, we see this reverse causal-interpretation as less plausible than the one we have identified: the rule of law and women's status are wrapped up in complex societal debates and attitudes that are unlikely to be changed by deference on international child abduction. 81 In order to address this concern, we first lagged our key independent variables by three years and the substantive 79 Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004. 80 Source: World Bank's World Development Indicators. 81 Uslaner 2008. results remained unchanged. This gives added credence to the temporal logic of our proposed causal pathway. As such lagging raises its own concerns, we also implemented Goodliffe's proposal to fix key independent variables at their initial value, thus reducing endogeneity concerns. 82 Once again, the results remained substantively unchanged. A stratified model and a frailty model also yielded similar results.
The various robustness analyses are reported in the online appendix.
Additional Evidence
In addition to our econometric analysis, qualitative evidence corroborates our hypothesized causal mechanism linking procedural and substantive fairness to deference on child abduction. As part of the accession process, acceding states are required to complete a standard questionnaire. The objective of this exercise is to ensure that the regulatory oversight of the two different systems is sufficiently similar such that the SEC is not violating its legislative mandate to ensure compliance with the U.S. federal securities laws and to protect investors, maintain competitive, orderly, fair, and efficient markets, and promote capital formation within the United States. Comparability helps make certain that an SEC exemption to a foreign financial service provider amounts to substituted compliance and does not open the U.S. capital market to regulatory arbitrage or in any way reduce U.S. market transparency.
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The first such agreement was signed in August 2008 between the SEC and its Australian counterpart. An academic assessment of the negotiation underscores the importance of the relative symmetry between domestic institutions and norms in the two states for the success of the agreement.
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In civil and commercial judgments, fairness concerns have been a major stumbling block to U.S.
participation in bilateral enforcement agreements as well as to reaching a global agreement. Foreign countries object to several substantive and procedural features of American civil justice. In terms of substantive legal outcomes, jury awards are often deemed excessive, and punitive damages are seen as contrary to public policy. 91 Foreign countries have also shown uneasiness with procedural elements of the U.S. legal system, including broad pretrial discovery rules, class action, contingency fees, and, most 88 Tafara and Peterson 2007. 89 Tafara and Peterson, 2007, 60 . 90 Verdier 2011, 95-96. Finally, in criminal law, extradition treaties often explicitly highlight substantive-fairness concerns with the inclusion of a double-criminality requirement: extradition may be granted with respect to offenses that are punishable in both the requesting country and the requested country. 99 Moreover, substantive-fairness concerns act to prevent the extradition of fugitives to states that might impose penalties deemed inhumane or in violation of physical-integrity rights. 100 Indeed, many countries reject extradition requests from countries that impose the death penalty if the latter fail to assure that the death penalty will not be sought.
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In summary, international deference is replete with questions of procedural and substantive fairness that recur across areas of law. Due process and impartiality of the judiciary are procedural requirements in the adjudication of commercial disputes, family disputes such as child abduction, as well as in criminal cases. Substantive fairness also has a common theme: the protection of fundamental rights and values, whose content varies across issues -from gender equality in family disputes through free speech in defamation cases to physical-integrity rights in criminal matters. 
Conclusion
Jurisdictional conflicts are at the heart of globalization politics. With the growing exchange of goods, people, and information, firms and citizens increasingly find themselves subject to multiple rules overseen by different regulatory and judicial authorities. At a minimum, such conflicts create uncertainty for companies and individuals and reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of the legal system. Also troubling is how such conflicts open up the possibility for forum shopping, as actors from one country try to leverage rules in another to destabilize their legal status quo, as well as the specter of a race-to-the-bottom.
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Much of the research that examines the globalization/authority nexus focuses either on international dispute settlement or policy harmonization. On the one hand, national treatment in combination with international dispute-settlement bodies (public and private) offers a channel to resolve jurisdictional conflicts. 103 On the other hand, harmonization projects in which states adopt parallel legal rules preempt them. 104 In this study, we hope to elevate a third, under-recognized pathway for managing globalization frictions: deference. The central idea behind deference is that domestic legal structures provide the means through which to manage jurisdictional conflicts. Governments, regulators, administrative agencies, and courts defer to the authority of foreign counterparts and in so doing resolve the problems associated with these conflicts. Deference then sidesteps the tricky problems associated 102 Raustiala 2004; Busch 2007 . 103 Mattli 2001; Allee and Peinhardt 2010. 104 Drezner 2007; Cao 2012. with the other two approaches: creating a legitimate international legal authority and the political backlash to harmonization projects that suppress domestic regulatory autonomy or cultural difference.
While deference is exercised across a range of policy domains -from securities regulation to criminal law -little research has attempted to systematically explain variation in deference at the global level. Given the potential risks of such sovereignty sharing, it is critical to better understand states' decisions to cooperate through deference agreements. In this article, then, we have developed a novel causal argument rooted in differences between domestic institutions and norms in the cooperating states.
More specifically, we focus on the belief that such sovereignty sharing will produce a fair result -both procedurally and substantively. Our analysis of the Hague Abduction Convention provides considerable support for our argument in what is, to our knowledge, the first global empirical study of deference agreements. A preliminary review of deference in the civil, commercial, and criminal domains suggests the broader applicability of our fairness argument beyond the area of family law. Future work will want to consider not only the factors that promote deference agreements but also the drivers of specific deference decisions made by regulators or courts.
In addition to elevating deference in globalization politics, this study has implications for other important debates in IR. First, the article underscores the critical interaction between domestic and international law. Legal and international relations scholars have long built a silo between the domestic and international legal spheres. 105 Yet deference rests on the idea that domestic law can serve as a central component of global governance. As such, our analysis of deference agreements is in keeping with a growing literature that has highlighted this interaction. arguments concerning the relationship between democracy and cooperation. 107 While complementing such work on democracy, our study also offers a more fine-grained understanding of the domestic institutions and norms that may contribute to cooperation, and it allows for variation in the cooperativeness of democracies. In focusing on these more nuanced institutional relationships, we hope to spark a broader debate about the relationship between domestic institutions and cooperation.
Third, and finally, our research makes an important contribution to the study of global cooperation against parental child-abduction. While thousands of children are abducted annually, no research in IR has been devoted to this problem. We hope to spur further analysis of this topic that looks not only at accession decisions under the Hague Convention, but at the actual outcomes of abduction disputes. Such research will be useful not only for policymakers engaged with the politics of child abduction, but hopefully for the parents and children as well. Migrant stock in accepting country Model 5 is a Weibull model; hazard ratios are reported. Models 6-8 are discrete-time models with cubic polynomials. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
